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Binocular rivalry provides a valuable means to study how
sensory processing gives rise to subjective experiences
because it involves a changing percept without any
change in the visual stimulus. An important question,
however, is whether visual awareness is necessary for
binocular rivalry to emerge. To address this question, we
presented conflicting random dot motion stimuli in the
two eyes at luminance contrasts around perceptual
threshold. We asked subjects to report continuously, via
button presses, if they noticed any kind of motion in the
display (be it coherent or not) and indicate which
direction of motion they thought was dominant at any
given instant even if they were unaware of any motion in
the display. We biased the competition between the two
dichoptic stimuli by changing the motion coherence in
one eye while keeping it fixed in the other to test if this
induced predictable changes in rivalry dynamics. We also
probed the strength of the interocular suppression. Our
data show that binocular rivalry continues even if
subjects claim complete absence of visual motion
awareness. This remarkable dissociation between
visually guided behavior and visual awareness resembles
the dissociation seen in other phenomena, such as
blindsight and visual masking. Fluctuations in awareness
that did occur were temporally linked to the dominance
switches in a manner that is consistent with adaptation
reciprocal-inhibition models of binocular rivalry.
Introduction
Binocular rivalry is a phenomenon that occurs when
our eyes receive stereo-incompatible inputs at the same
retinal location. This leads to perceptual alternations
between the two images even though both stimuli are
constantly present. The fact that our percept changes
without any change in the visual stimulus (Blake &
Logothetis, 2002; Kim & Blake, 2005; Rees, Kreiman,
& Koch, 2002; Tong, 2003) advocated the use of
binocular rivalry to study the neural basis of conscious
visual perception (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996) and
qualiﬁed it as a ‘‘window on consciousness’’ (Logo-
thetis, 1999). It has been shown, however, that the
suppression of one eye’s image corresponds only to a
partial loss of contrast sensitivity to probe stimuli in
that eye (Blake & Fox, 1974; Fox & Check, 1968, 1972;
Nguyen, Freeman, & Alais, 2003; Norman, Norman, &
Bilotta, 2000), indicating that those inputs are still
processed by the brain. This notion is further supported
by the fact that a suppressed stimulus can still affect the
currently dominant percept by changing its perceived
orientation (Pearson & Clifford, 2005), direction of
motion (Andrews & Blakemore, 2002), luminance
(Carlson & He, 2000), and color (Carney, Shadlen, &
Switkes, 1987; Holmes, Hancock, & Andrews, 2006;
Hong & Shevell, 2009) and still provides disparity cues
enabling stereoscopic depth perception (Andrews &
Holmes, 2011; Su, He, & Ooi, 2009). Moreover,
stimulus-speciﬁc activation in striate and extrastriate
cortical areas does not necessarily result in awareness of
the underlying stimulus (Haynes & Rees, 2005; He,
Cavanagh, & Intriligator, 1996; Moutoussis & Zeki,
2006). Thus, it is possible that binocular rivalry occurs
even in the absence of visual awareness. We tested this
possibility in two experiments in which we studied
dominance and suppression of rivalrous random dot
motion stimuli whose luminance contrasts were set
around perceptual threshold.
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Akey feature of binocular rivalry is that decreasing the
‘‘stimulus strength’’ in one eye primarily increases the
mean dominance duration of the other eye while the
mean dominance duration of the eye in which the
stimulus strength is manipulated remains almost unaf-
fected (Brascamp, van Ee, Noest, Jacobs, & van den
Berg, 2006; Levelt, 1966). This relationship, known as
Levelt’s second proposition (L2, Levelt, 1965), may seem
counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance but is easily explained in
terms of reciprocal inhibition in which a given stimulus
does not generate an isolated response but one linked to
the response generated by another competing stimulus
(Blake, 1989; Freeman, 2005; Lehky, 1988; Noest, van
Ee, Nijs, & vanWezel, 2007; Platonov &Goossens, 2013;
Wilson, 2003). Most previous studies have varied
stimulus contrast to investigate the inﬂuence of ‘‘stimulus
strength’’ on the dynamics of binocular rivalry alterna-
tions (e.g., Brascamp et al., 2006; Fox & Rasche, 1969;
Mueller & Blake, 1989). We have recently shown,
however, that changes in motion coherence are equally
effective (Platonov & Goossens, 2013). We also noticed,
in that study, that subjects were no longer aware of any
motion in the display when we presented rivalrous
motion stimuli at contrast levels for which they could still
easily discern (.75% correct) the direction of motion in
unambiguous motion patterns. We thus reasoned that it
should be possible to manipulate visual awareness by
changing the luminance contrast around the subjects’
motion discrimination threshold and then test L2 under
these different conditions by lowering the proportion of
coherently moving dots in one eye while keeping it ﬁxed
at 100% in the other and asking our subjects to indicate
which direction of motion they thought was dominant at
any given instant even if they were unaware of any
motion in the display. To assess whether or not the
subjects were aware of visual motion at the time of these
decisions, we also asked them to indicate continuously
whether or not they noticed any kind of motion in the
display. In this way, we could also study the temporal
relationship between state changes in awareness and
dominance switches. In the second experiment, we used a
probe detection paradigm (Fox & Check, 1968; Stuit,
Cass, Paffen, & Alais, 2009) to test if the dominance
alternations reported in the ﬁrst experiment indeed
resulted from eye dominance alternations.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Seven healthy human subjects with (corrected to)
normal visual acuity and normal stereovision partici-
pated. They were naı¨ve to the purpose of the
experiments. All gave informed consent for participa-
tion. The experiments were approved by the Radboud
University Nijmegen Medical Centre.
Setup
Subjects were seated in front of a liquid crystal display
(Dell, 2007WFPb; resolution 1680 · 1050 pixels, 60-Hz
refresh rate) in an otherwise dark room with their head
supported by a headrest. The visual stimuli were
generated by a personal computer equipped with an
openGL graphics card using the Psychophysics Toolbox
extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for Matlab (The
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). The images were
presented separately to the left and right eyes by means
of a front-mirror stereoscope (HyperView, Berezin;
viewing distance 67 cm). The display was calibrated with
a precision Minolta Luminance Meter LS-100.
Visual stimuli
The dichoptic stimuli consisted of two independently
generated random dot kinematograms (RDKs) each
containing 533 white dots (2 · 2 pixels, 0.058) that
moved against a gray background. Signal dots were
refreshed asynchronously. At the beginning of its
lifetime, each dot started at a random location within the
circular aperture (48 radius) and then moved leftward or
rightward at 4.28/s for four frames (66.7 ms). Dots that
moved outside the aperture were wrapped to the
opposite side of the aperture. Noise dots—if present—
moved to a new random location within the aperture on
each subsequent frame. We manipulated the luminance
of the dots as well as the percentage of signal dots. The
background luminance was always 15.43 cd/m2.
Motion discrimination threshold
For each participant (n¼ 7), we ﬁrst determined the
contrast threshold for his/her monocular motion
direction–discrimination performance using a two-
alternative forced-choice task (2AFC). This task
required the subject to discriminate between leftward
and rightward monocular motion stimuli that con-
tained 100% coherently moving dots. Each trial started
with a button press, followed by the presentation of a
central ﬁxation point, which the subject had to ﬁxate
for the remainder of the trial. Subsequently, a visual
motion stimulus was presented in either the left or the
right eye for 0.5 s. At the end of each stimulus
presentation, the subject had to indicate the perceived
direction of motion, guessing if necessary. In each trial,
the luminance of all dots was set to one of six possible
levels between 15.43 cd/m2 and 18.69 cd/m2, corre-
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sponding to contrasts in the range of 0%–10%
Michelson. The background luminance (15.43 cd/m2)
was the same in both eyes. Thresholds (75% correct;
averaged across left and right eyes) were around 5%
Michelson (also see Platonov & Goossens, 2013).
Experiment 1: Dominance
alternations
Paradigm
In the ﬁrst experiment, we manipulated the lumi-
nance contrast of rivalrous motion stimuli (Figure 1A)
around the subjects’ motion discrimination threshold
(see Materials and methods) and tested for the resulting
different levels of visual awareness whether the motion
coherence in the monocular image sequences could bias
the competition between the dichoptically presented
motion patterns as predicted by L2. Toward that end,
we systematically varied the proportion of signal to
noise dots in either the left or the right eye’s motion
pattern so that, in each trial, coherence was ﬁxed at
100% in one (ﬁxed) eye and set to 30%, 50%, 70%, or
90% in the other (manipulated) eye. The contrast in
both eyes was set to one of three possible levels (low,
medium, and high contrast conditions) by changing the
luminance of all dots in the otherwise ﬁxed display. For
a given trial, the luminance of the dots was either 0.25
cd/m2 below (low contrast, ;4.9% Michelson), 0.25 cd/
Figure 1. Motion rivalry paradigm with contrast manipulation to influence visual motion awareness. (A) Subjects were dichoptically
presented with a central fixation point (þ) and two random dot motion patterns in which the dots moved coherently in opposite
directions. Arrows indicate the direction of motion of the moving signal dots. Bullets represent noise dots, which appeared at a random
location within the aperture in each frame. The percentage of coherently moving dots was kept fixed at 100% in one eye (here the left
eye) and manipulated between 30% and 90% in the other eye (here the right eye). Motion directions and coherence manipulations were
randomly swapped between the two eyes across trials. We tested three contrast conditions (approximately, 4.9%, 6.3%, and 7.8%
Michelson in both eyes) close to the subjects’ monocular motion direction–discrimination threshold (;5% Michelson). (B) Example of
changes in visual awareness and motion-direction dominance in one of our subjects over a series of trials (different rows) in the
medium-contrast condition. Subjects reported continuously if they were aware of any visual motion in the display (gray), regardless of its
appearance, and had to indicate whether the direction of coherent motion was predominantly to the left (green) or to the right (red),
guessing if necessary. Remarkably, alternations between dominance of the leftward and rightward motion direction did not require
awareness of visual motion. (C) Percentage of total viewing time during which subjects indicated awareness of any visual motion (be it
coherent or not) in the low- (light gray), medium- (gray), and high- (black) contrast conditions increased with increasing contrast. At the
lowest contrast (;4.9% Michelson), subjects were almost always unaware of any visual motion in the stimulus. Coherence did not affect
the percentage of visual motion awareness. Data are averaged across subjects (n¼ 5). Error bars indicate 61 SEM.
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m2 above (medium contrast, ;6.3% Michelson), or 0.75
cd/m2 above (high contrast, ;7.8% Michelson) the
subject’s monocular motion direction–discrimination
threshold; 0.25 cd/m2 was the smallest practical change
in luminance permitted by our equipment. This
approach ensured that the contrast manipulation
produced robust changes in visual awareness (see
results, Figure 1B) while the monocular stimuli
themselves had sufﬁcient contrast to support motion-
direction discrimination well above chance. A trial
began with a 0.28 central ﬁxation cross. Subsequently,
RDKs with horizontal motion in the two opposite
directions were presented to the left and right eyes for
60 s. Subjects were instructed to ﬁxate the ﬁxation cross
and perform a motion-detection task by pressing and
holding the middle button as long as they were able to
perceive any visual motion, regardless of its appear-
ance. In addition, they were asked to discriminate
between the two directions of motion, even if they were
unable to discern any visual motion whatsoever, by
pressing and holding one of the two mouse buttons as
long as either one of the motion directions was thought
to be dominant, guessing if necessary.
Motion directions (temporal-to-nasal or nasal-to-
temporal) and eye of manipulation were counterbal-
anced across trials. To avoid big luminance changes
between trials, they were organized in randomized
blocks of either low and medium contrast stimuli or
medium and high contrast stimuli. All subjects (n ¼ 5)
accomplished six low/medium blocks and four medi-
um/high blocks. This resulted in 12 trials per coher-
ence/contrast condition after pooling the data across
eyes.
We also ran two control experiments with two
additional subjects, in which we interleaved low-
contrast stimuli with catch trials (see Supplementary
Appendix). In the ﬁrst of those experiments, the catch
trials contained no stimulus other than the ﬁxation
cross. In the second one, the low-contrast RDKs
presented in the catch trials only contained dynamic
noise.
Data analysis
Dominance durations and predominance
To analyze the data, we marked all phases of motion
awareness indicated by the middle button presses and
calculated the percentage of total viewing time during
which subjects indicated awareness of visual motion.
We also marked all phases of leftward and rightward
motion-direction dominance based on the left and right
button presses. For each trial, we then calculated the
mean dominance duration of each motion direction as
well as its predominance; predominance is deﬁned as
the percentage of the total viewing time during which a
given motion direction was dominant. Truncated
dominance states at the end of a trial were included in
the predominance measure. For computing the mean
dominance duration, we included truncated states that
encompassed more than 85% of the total trial duration.
The resulting values were then averaged across trials,
pooling motion-direction dominance according to the
eye receiving that stimulus (i.e., the ipsilateral and
contralateral eye). We compared the results across
conditions using repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA). We also used analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) to ﬁt linear regression lines to the data and
applied Student’s t tests on the resulting ﬁt parameters
to evaluate changes in the response curves. Test results
reported in the text always refer to the group statistics.
For the low-contrast condition, we also calculated
predominance and mean dominance durations from the
epochs containing no episodes of visual awareness. For
the medium-contrast condition, we split all dominance
durations into ‘‘high awareness’’ and ‘‘low awareness’’
groups. To this end, we ﬁrst computed, for each
dominance epoch, the percentage of time during which
the subject indicated being aware of visual motion, i.e.,
the awareness fraction. We then calculated the distri-
bution of awareness fractions across all dominance
epochs and assigned all dominance epochs with an
awareness fraction above the 50th percentile to the
high-awareness data set and those with awareness
fractions below the 50th percentile to the low-aware-
ness data set. These ﬁltered data sets were subsequently
analyzed in the same fashion as the unﬁltered ones.
Cross-correlations
The temporal relationship between changes in
awareness and dominance was investigated with cross-
correlation analyses in the time and phase domain. We
ﬁrst computed cross-correlograms representing the
average occurrence density of awareness onset and
offset (in counts per second) as a function of time (in
seconds) relative to the dominance switches (Figure
4A). These cross-correlograms were generated with a
temporal resolution of 60 bins/s and convolved with a
Gaussian smoothing kernel (width r ¼ 0.2 s). To test
whether the resulting peaks were statistically signiﬁcant
in individual subjects, we ﬁrst corrected the raw cross-
correlograms with the so-called shift predictor (a
measure of the correlation that can be expected under
the null hypothesis that there is no physical relationship
between the two different events; see Aertsen, Gerstein,
Habib, & Palm, 1989; Gerstein & Kiang, 1960) and
then applied the bootstrap excursion (BE) test devel-
oped by Ventura, Cai, and Kass (2005). See Kalisvaart
and Goossens (2013) for a more detailed description of
this procedure. We then tested whether awareness
exhibits phase locking with respect to the dominance
alternation cycle. Toward that end, we computed the
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awareness probability as a function of phase in the two
subsequent dominance intervals (Figure 4B). Phase
refers to the normalized timing in these two intervals.
By convention, we normalized the relative timing
during each individual dominance interval of motion
stimuli in the manipulated ipsilateral eye between 1
and 0 in such a way that1 and 0 correspond with its
onset and offset, respectively. The relative timing
during dominance intervals of motion stimuli in the
ﬁxed contralateral eye was normalized between 0 and 1
so that their onsets and offsets correspond with phase
values of 0 and 1, respectively. The probability curves
were computed with a resolution of 36 bins per
dominance state (so 72 bins in total across the full
alternation cycle).
Finally, we examined whether the occurrence of
dominance switches was phase locked to the changes in
awareness (Figure 5). Toward that end, we determined
the average switch counts as a function of their
normalized timing relative to the awareness onsets (at
phase 0) and offsets (at phase 1 and þ1). These
occurrence density curves were computed with a
resolution of 36 phase bins per awareness state (72 bins
in total across the full unaware-aware cycle) and
convolved with a circular Gaussian smoothing kernel
(width r ¼ 2 bins). We used ANOVA to test whether
phase locking was statistically signiﬁcant and possibly
inﬂuenced by our stimulus manipulation.
Results
As outlined above, we presented rivalrous motion
stimuli at different contrast levels close to the subjects’
Figure 2. Changes in motion-direction dominance carry the signature of binocular rivalry. Predominance (A) and mean dominance
durations (B) of the motion direction presented in the fixed (solid) and manipulated (dashed) eye in the low- (light gray), medium-
(gray), and high- (black) contrast conditions as a function of motion coherence in the manipulated eye. Note that decreasing the
motion coherence in one eye produced a robust increase in predominance and mean dominance durations of the motion direction
presented in the contralateral fixed eye. After removing, from the low-contrast data, all dominance epochs with episodes of visual
motion awareness, there were still significant changes in predominance (C) and mean dominance durations (D) as a function of
ipsilateral motion coherence. As for the unfiltered data, these changes complied with L2 (Levelt, 1965). Data are averaged across
subjects (n ¼ 5). Error bars indicate 61 SEM.
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motion discrimination threshold to change the level of
visual awareness, and we varied the percentage of
coherently moving dots in one eye while keeping it ﬁxed
at 100% in the other to test if these monocular changes
in motion coherence systematically biased the compe-
tition between the two motion patterns (Figure 1A).
We asked the subjects to perform a motion-detection
task in which they had to indicate continuously if they
noticed any visual motion in the display, be it coherent
motion, dynamic noise, or any other kind of visual
motion. We also asked them to perform a 2AFC task in
which they had to discriminate continuously which
direction of motion was dominant at any given
moment, guessing if necessary. Figure 1B illustrates the
responses of one subject (S1) in the medium-contrast
condition when the proportion of coherently moving
dots in the manipulated eye was 90%. Note that the
subject reported switches in dominance of the leftward
(green) and rightward (red) motion direction regardless
of whether she was aware (gray) or unaware of any
motion in the stimulus patch.
Figure 1C quantiﬁes the average percentage of total
viewing time during which the subjects indicated being
aware of any visual motion in the display for the high-
(black), medium- (gray), and low- (black) contrast
conditions. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated a
signiﬁcant main effect of contrast on this measure of
visual awareness, F(2, 788) ¼ 90,444.6, p  0.001; it
decreased from nearly 98% in the high-contrast
condition to never reaching 15% in the low-contrast
condition. Motion coherence, on the other hand, had
no signiﬁcant effect on the average level of visual
motion awareness, ANOVA main effect: F(3, 788) ¼
0.68, p . 0.5; contrast · coherence interaction: F(6,
788)¼0.52, p. 0.75). The percentage of false alarms in
these subjective awareness reports proved to be
negligibly small as subjects almost never reported
motion awareness during catch trials in which no
stimulus was presented (control experiment in two
naı¨ve subjects; Supplementary Appendix, Figure A1).
Levelt’s second proposition
Given that our subjects were often unaware of
motion in the stimuli, especially in the lowest contrast
condition, it is not obvious that a particular motion-
direction judgment can be linked to dominance of the
eye receiving that motion stimulus. Indeed, on de-
brieﬁng, our subjects reported that they were very
uncertain about their motion-direction judgments. It is
possible therefore that they were just guessing ran-
domly instead of reporting true alternations in eye
dominance. If this were the case, however, systematic
manipulation of the motion coherence in one eye
should not produce any systematic difference in
reported dominance of the two directions of motion.
By contrast, if eye dominance alternations continue in
the absence of visual awareness and subjects consis-
tently use information from the dominant eye to
perform the discrimination task, their motion-direction
judgments should, on average, correlate with the
direction and coherence of the manipulated motion
pattern. More speciﬁcally, in this case, one would
expect an increasing difference between mean domi-
nance durations of the two motion directions as a
function of decreasing coherence in the manipulated
eye. In fact, as outlined in the Introduction, one would
expect these changes to obey L2 because it is one of the
hallmarks of binocular rivalry. Therefore, if binocular
rivalry persists in the absence of visual awareness,
decreasing the motion coherence in one eye should
mainly increase dominance durations of the motion
direction presented in the other eye and, consequently,
boost predominance of the motion direction presented
in that eye as we previously observed for high-contrast
motion stimuli (Platonov & Goossens, 2013).
The left-hand panels in Figure 2 show the average
predominance (Figure 2A) and mean dominance
durations (Figure 2B) of motion direction presented in
the ipsilateral and contralateral eyes under the low-
(light gray), medium- (gray) and high- (black) contrast
conditions. The data are plotted as a function of
motion coherence in the manipulated ipsilateral eye.
Note that changing the motion coherence in one eye led
to signiﬁcantly different changes in predominance
(Figure 2A), ANOVA, eye · coherence interaction,
F(3, 1576) ¼ 124.11, p  0.001, and mean dominance
durations (Figure 2B), ANOVA, eye · coherence
interaction, F(3, 1576)¼ 64.24, p  0.001, of the
Figure 3. Fluctuations in awareness affect rivalry dynamics.
Durations of dominance epochs with low- (gray) and high-
(black) awareness fractions were affected differently. The
dissociation between dominance durations of motion in the
fixed (solid) and manipulated (dashed) eye was boosted for the
high awareness epochs. Data are averaged across subjects (n¼
5). Error bars indicate 61 SEM.
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motion direction presented to that eye and the
contralateral eye. As coherence in one eye decreased,
both predominance and mean dominance durations of
motion direction in the other eye’s pattern increased
systematically from near symmetric dominance of the
two stimuli to almost exclusive dominance of motion
direction presented in the contralateral ﬁxed eye. This
effect was consistently observed in all our subjects. By
contrast, there were no signiﬁcant biases toward one or
the other motion direction if the signal dots in both
eyes were replaced with noise or if there was no
stimulus at all (see Supplementary Appendix, Figure
A2).
We used analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to
quantify the characteristic response patterns shown in
Figure 2. The results demonstrated that decreasing the
coherence in one eye’s motion pattern indeed caused a
signiﬁcant increase in dominance of the other eye’s
motion pattern. This is reﬂected by the negative slopes
for the low (Figure 2B, light gray solid curve), slope a¼
7.12 6 0.62, t(2)¼7.29, p 0.001, medium (Figure
2B, gray solid curve), slope a ¼6.72 6 0.47, t(2)¼
8.67, p  0.01, and high (Figure 2B, black solid
curve), slope a¼10.60 6 0.72, t(2)¼8.12, p 0.01,
contrast conditions. Moreover, as predicted by L2, the
increase in mean dominance durations of the ﬁxed eye’s
motion pattern was, on average, more than four times
steeper than the concomitant decrease in mean
dominance durations of the motion direction presented
in the manipulated eye. This signiﬁcant difference in
slope was observed for the low-, a¼ 1.90 6 0.62, t(2)¼
7.29, p 0.001; medium-, a¼ 1.37 6 0.47, t(2)¼ 8.67,
p 0.001; and high-, a¼ 1.14 6 0.72, t(2)¼ 8.12, p
0.001, contrast conditions alike.
The compliance with L2 even in the lowest contrast
condition is quite remarkable. But due to the presence
Figure 4. Temporal relationship between dominance switches and changes in awareness. (A) Cross-correlation between dominance
switches and awareness onsets (A1) and offsets (A2) on an absolute time scale. Data for the low- (light gray), medium- (gray), and
high- (black) contrast conditions are taken from the 90% coherence condition and averaged across subjects (n ¼ 5). (B) Awareness
probabilities in the low- (light gray), medium- (gray), and high- (black) contrast conditions plotted as a function of phase in the
dominance alternation cycle for the 30% (B1), 50% (B2), 70% (B3), and 90% (B4) coherence conditions. Negative and positive phase
values correspond with normalized dominance time of the motion direction presented in the ipsilateral and contralateral eyes,
respectively. Data are averaged across subjects (n¼ 5). Error bars indicate 61 SEM.
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of brief motion awareness epochs, it is not immediately
clear whether L2 still holds when the stimuli did not
reach the threshold for visual awareness. To test for
this, we also quantiﬁed the mean durations of
dominance epochs that contained no episodes of visual
motion awareness. The right-hand panels in Figure 2
plot the resulting predominance (Figure 2C) and mean
dominance durations (Figure 2D) of the two eyes’
motion patterns across all unaware dominance epochs
under the low contrast condition. Analysis of this
cleaned-up data set also shows that decreasing the
coherence in one eye led to signiﬁcantly different
changes in predominance (Figure 2C), ANCOVA, eye
· coherence interaction, F(1, 476) ¼ 34.42, p  0.001,
and mean dominance durations (Figure 2D),
ANCOVA, eye · coherence interaction, F(1,476) ¼
25.07, p  0.001, of the motion direction in the
manipulated and ﬁxed eyes. Moreover, the decrease in
mean dominance durations of the ﬁxed eye’s motion
pattern with decreasing motion coherence in the
manipulated eye, (a ¼4.66 6 0.62, t(2)¼ 5.01, p 
0.001, was, on average, more than two times steeper
than the concomitant increase in dominance of the
motion direction in the manipulated eye, a ¼ 1.60 6
0.62, t(2)¼ 7.29, p  0.001. Thus, our results
demonstrate that monocular changes in motion coher-
ence systematically biased the durations of the mo-
tiondirection–dominance states in accordance with L2
even if subjects were unaware of any visual motion in
the display. This strongly suggests that binocular
motion rivalry proceeds in the absence of visual
awareness, but it does not mean that visual awareness
(or attention) has no inﬂuence on the rivalry dynamics
or that their time courses are independent.
Influence of awareness level
Our ANCOVA indicated that the effect of ipsilateral
motion coherence on predominance, t(2)¼13.47, p
0.001, and mean dominance durations, t(2)¼11.86, p
 0.001, of the other motion pattern was signiﬁcantly
different between the three contrast conditions, but it is
difﬁcult to dissociate whether this interaction effect was
due to changes in stimulus contrast or due to the
Figure 5. Dominance switches occurred in all phases of the two awareness states (i.e., aware vs. unaware). Switch occurrences in the
low- (light gray), medium- (gray), and high- (black) contrast conditions (expressed in counts per bin) are plotted as a function of their
normalized timing (i.e., phase) in the motion-awareness epochs for the 30% (A), 50% (B), 70% (C), and 90% (D) coherence. Data are
averaged across subjects (n ¼ 5).
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concomitant changes in visual awareness (c.f., Figure
1C). Interestingly, however, for the low-contrast
condition, the changes in mean dominance duration of
motion direction in the contralateral eye were steeper
when data were pooled across aware and unaware
states (Figure 2B, light gray solid curve) compared with
the data from unaware states only (Figure 2D). This
suggests that the level of visual awareness itself does
inﬂuence the rivalry dynamics.
To further test if the average level of visual
awareness inﬂuenced the rivalry dynamics, we analyzed
the mean dominance durations obtained in the medium
contrast condition by splitting them into high-aware-
ness and low-awareness groups (see data analysis). We
used the data from the medium-contrast condition
because this condition yielded a relatively large
variation in the awareness fraction across dominance
intervals due to the fact that the subjects were, on
average, aware of visual motion for about 40% of the
viewing time (c.f. Figure 2). Figure 3 plots the resulting
mean dominance durations of motion direction in the
manipulated (dashed) and ﬁxed (solid) eyes for the low-
(gray) and high- (black) awareness data. Intercepts of
the regression lines for the high-awareness data were
signiﬁcantly higher for motion patterns in the ﬁxed eye,
ANCOVA, t(1)¼ 4.54, p  0.001, compared with the
low-awareness data. Moreover, the difference in slope
of the two regression lines for motion in the ﬁxed and
manipulated eyes was signiﬁcantly larger in the high-
versus low-awareness data, ANCOVA, coherence ·
awareness interaction, F(1, 451) ¼ 4.10, p , 0.05. Our
ﬁndings thus indicate that awareness (or attention) can
boost mean dominance durations and the effect of
motion coherence on those dominance durations.
Covariation of changes in dominance and awareness
We also tested if dominance switches and changes in
awareness had any temporal relationship to one
another. In all subjects, there was indeed a correlation
between the timing of the onsets and offsets of the
awareness intervals and the dominance switches (BE
tests, p , 0.01; Materials and methods). This is
illustrated in the cross-correlograms of Figure 4A in
which the density of awareness onsets (Figure 4A1) and
offsets (Figure 4A2) is plotted as a function of time for
one of the coherence conditions (90%). Note that there
was a clear peak in the occurrence of awareness onsets
immediately after the dominance switches (Figure 4A1,
lag time about 150–400 ms) while the occurrence of
awareness offsets clearly peaked just before these
switches (Figure 4A2; lead time about 200–500 ms).
Both effects were contrast dependent with the weakest
and strongest coincidences occurring in the low- (light
gray) and high- (black) contrast conditions, respec-
tively. Similar results were obtained for the other
coherence conditions (not shown). These ﬁndings
suggest that dominance changes tend to trigger
awareness while loss of awareness or attention, in turn,
tends to trigger a dominance change. An alternative
interpretation, however, is that these events are caused
by a common mechanism. Adaptation reciprocal-
inhibition models (Blake, 1989; Freeman, 2005; Lehky,
1988; Noest et al., 2007; Wilson, 2003) suggest, for
example, that switches arise from adaptation of the
currently dominant population and recovery of the
suppressed population. It is conceivable, therefore, that
awareness is more easily lost at the end of a dominance
epoch due to progressive adaptation of the dominant
population and that, at the moment of the switch,
awareness is more easily (re)gained because the now
dominant population has recovered from its previously
adapted state. If so, one would expect that changes in
awareness probability are phase locked to the domi-
nance switches. We, therefore, analyzed the awareness
probability as a function of normalized time in the two
respective dominance epochs. In the resulting phase
plots (Figure 4B), negative phase values correspond
with dominance of the motion direction in the
ipsilateral eye, and positive phase values correspond
with dominance of the other eye’s motion direction.
Note, there was a strong periodic modulation of the
awareness probability, ANOVA, main effect of phase:
F(71, 4211)¼ 1.73, p  0.001. Typically there was an
abrupt drop in awareness probability just before the
occurrence of a dominance switch, which was then
followed by a somewhat more gradual increase in
awareness probability over the course of the subsequent
dominance epoch. The magnitude of this modulation
varied with stimulus contrast, ANOVA, main effect,
F(2, 4211) ¼ 3114.37, p  0.001, and coherence,
ANOVA, main effect, F(3, 4211)¼ 42.65, p  0.001,
but the shape of the normalized time courses was
remarkably similar, ANOVA, phase · contrast inter-
action, F(142, 4211)¼ 0.46, p . 0.99; phase ·
coherence interaction, F(213, 4211)¼ 0.16, p . 0.99;
and phase · contrast · coherence interaction, F(426,
4211)¼ 0.17, p . 0.99. In fact, it appeared that even in
the high-contrast condition, subjects generally claimed
being unaware of visual motion at the time of a
dominance switch. One might worry that this striking
result could be due to some movement coordination
problem, forcing our subjects to transiently release the
middle mouse button to indicate a dominance switch
on the other two buttons, but this was not the case: Our
subjects did not report such coordination problems on
debrieﬁng, and for the vast majority of switches,
releases of the middle button and presses of that same
button did not coincide within a 2-s time window
around the switch (not shown).
Given that awareness onsets tend to be preceded by
dominance switches, one might wonder how far into a
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given awareness epoch switches occur. Figure 5
therefore examines how the distribution of dominance
switches changed over the course of the two awareness
states (i.e., aware vs. unaware) by plotting the average
switch counts as a function of their normalized timing
relative to the awareness onsets (at phase 0) and offsets
(at phase1 andþ1). Although the switch densities (in
counts per phase bin) were signiﬁcantly modulated by
the awareness phase, ANOVA, main effect, F(71, 4211)
¼ 1.4, p , 0.02, stimulus contrast, ANOVA, main
effect, F(2, 4211) ¼ 8.7, p 0.001, and motion
coherence, ANOVA, main effect, F(3, 4211)¼ 7.01, p
 0.001, the overall picture is that switches occurred
throughout the two awareness states. There seems to be
some contrast-dependent phase locking, but this is at
least partly explained by contrast-induced changes in
awareness durations. For example, in the high-contrast
conditions, awareness durations were comparatively
long (not shown), making it likely that a switch occurs
within that phase while it becomes unlikely that a
switch occurs in an unaware epoch. This explains why
the switch density is low during the unaware state and
comparatively high for the aware state.
Discussion
In theory, it is possible that, due to the shorter
lifetimes of the noise dots compared with the signal
dots (Materials and methods), the decreases in coher-
ence also reduced the effective contrast of the
manipulated motion pattern. Note, however, that this
possible side effect does not affect the interpretation of
our results because it would merely contribute to the
intended monocular decrease in ‘‘stimulus strength.’’
Our data suggest that this contribution is in fact
negligible because the mean visual awareness levels
were not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by changes in motion
coherence (Figure 1C).
One might suspect that subjects made more errors
in correctly identifying the direction of motion in the
currently dominant eye as reducing stimulus contrast
decreased the motion awareness level. Note, however,
that an increased tendency to perform at chance level
should have inﬂuenced the dominance durations of
both directions of motion. The same prediction holds
for the inﬂuence that contrast might have had on the
processing (Krekelberg, van Wezel, & Albright, 2006)
and perception of stimulus speed (Thompson, Brooks,
& Hammett, 2006). Instead, we found that the
relationship between motion coherence in the manip-
ulated eye and mean dominance duration of the
motion direction presented in that same eye was
remarkably invariant to the changes in contrast
(Figure 2B, dashed lines), ANCOVA, coherence ·
contrast interaction, F(2, 794) ¼ 1.41, p . 0.24. This
supports the conclusion that the inﬂuence of contrast
on the systematic changes in mean dominance
duration of motion direction in the ﬁxed eye (Figure
2B, solid lines), ANCOVA, t(2) ¼11.86, p  0.001,
are not an artifact of changes in falsely identiﬁed
motion directions or modiﬁcations in speed tuning but
instead reﬂect true changes in the dynamics of eye
dominance alternations.
Previous experiments in which binocular rivalry was
studied with static orthogonal gratings have shown that
binocular rivalry is replaced by superposition of the
two images into a plaid percept if the contrast of the
gratings is low (Liu, Tyler, & Schor, 1992). A major
concern with interpreting our data as resulting from eye
dominance alternations is therefore that the two
dichoptic motion patterns might have fused. In this
case, decreasing the motion coherence in one eye would
attenuate the strength of this motion signal in the fused
image, so one might expect a decrease in dominance of
the corresponding motion direction—the pattern ob-
served in Experiment 1. Our subjects were unable to
discern whether fusion occurred. To rule out this
possibility, we therefore tested if one of the two
rivalrous motion patterns underwent suppression even
if subjects had no visual motion awareness using a
probe detection task.
Experiment 2: Probe detection
Paradigm
In the second experiment, we probed the strength of
suppression of the nondominant motion pattern in four
subjects who also participated in Experiment 1.
Suppression strength of an image in one eye is usually
determined by measuring the detection threshold for a
brief probe stimulus presented to one eye while its
image is suppressed and comparing that threshold to
the threshold for detection of those probes in the same
eye while its image is dominant (Fox & Check, 1968).
In our study, the probe was a square patch of moving
stimulus dots in the center of the right eye’s motion
pattern (Figure 6A). The probe was presented either in
the dominance or suppression phase for which no
visual motion awareness was indicated.
The probe-detection task was adopted from Stuit et
al. (2009) and modiﬁed for our purpose. Stimulus
contrast was identical to the lowest contrast level of
Experiment 1. Motion coherence was kept ﬁxed at
100% in both eyes. Subjects were instructed to perform
the same two tasks as in Experiment 1 (Figure 6A1)
until a few switches in motion-direction dominance had
occurred. Then, approximately 0.5–1.0 s after the onset
of the next dominance epoch and in the absence of
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visual motion awareness, a short beep was sounded.
This beep was immediately followed by a 28 · 28 square
probe in center of the right eye’s image (Figure 6A2).
The trial continued, and subjects then had to indicate
whether they did or did not see a probe by pressing
either the right or the left button, respectively (Figure
6A3). This button press terminated the trial.
The probe consisted of moving stimulus dots that
underwent a transient luminance increase. No dots
were added to the display. Only the luminance of
stimulus dots moving within the probe area was ﬁrst
increased and then decreased to the baseline level along
a Gaussian proﬁle. This was done with the right eye’s
motion pattern either in the dominant or suppressed
state. The Gaussian envelope had a standard deviation
of 57 ms and was truncated at63.5 SD (6200 ms). The
amplitude of the Gaussian corresponded to the probe’s
contrast and was varied across 40 trials using the
adaptive Quest procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983)
implemented in the Quest toolbox (Department of
Psychology, New York University) extension for
Matlab.
Data analysis
The dependent variable was the probe contrast
required to perform the probe detection task at 75%
correct when motion direction in the right eye was
either dominant or suppressed. These thresholds were
determined using the adaptive Quest procedure (Wat-
son & Pelli, 1983) and compared for the dominant and
suppressed state using Student’s t tests.
Results
Figure 6B plots the subjects’ (S1–S4) thresholds for
the probe-detection task when the eye’s motion pattern
was suppressed (gray circles) or dominant (black
circles). The results indicate that the contrast sensitivity
for detection of the probe was signiﬁcantly lower when
the motion pattern in that eye was suppressed
compared with when it was dominant, paired t test, t(3)
¼ 3.97, p , 0.025. In all our subjects, this loss of
sensitivity in the eye with the suppressed motion
pattern was on the order of 0.6–0.7 log units, which is
quantitatively consistent with previous studies (Blake &
Fox, 1974; Fox & Check, 1968, 1972; Nguyen et al.,
2003) reporting a partial loss of contrast sensitivity of
0.3–0.7 log units for high-contrast stimuli. Our ﬁndings
thus show that random dot motion stimuli still elicit eye
dominance alternations even if their contrasts are too
low to support visual awareness.
Discussion
Results from monocular probe-detection tasks are
generally interpreted as the ability of the visual
system to process a currently suppressed stimulus,
reminiscent of the blindsight effect in neurological
Figure 6. Conflicting motion stimuli induced interocular suppression in the absence of visual awareness. (A) Illustration of the probe
detection task. (A1) Subjects (n¼ 4) performed the same motion-detection and discrimination tasks as in Experiment 1. (A2) After a
few switches in motion-direction dominance, in the absence of visual motion awareness, a brief probe was presented in the right eye
immediately after a beep. (A3) The trial continued until the subject pressed either the left or right mouse button, indicating if he or
she thought the probe had been presented after the beep. (B) Individual subjects’ (S1–S4) thresholds for the probe-detection task
when motion direction in the probed eye was either in the suppressed (gray circles) or dominant (black circles) state. Error bars
indicate 61 SEM as computed from the adaptive Quest procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983).
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patients (Weiskrantz, 1998). However, an alternative
interpretation could be that presentation of the probe
itself disrupts the image suppression and causes a
reversal of rivalry dominance between the two eyes
(Baker & Cass, 2013). Recently, Baker and Cass
tested this notion by measuring both probe-detection
accuracy and subjective conﬁdence in those judg-
ments (as a measure of awareness given by a binary
response at the end of each trial). They found that
subjects performed a probe-detection task with high
accuracy but low conﬁdence, indicating that the
differences in sensitivity between the suppressed and
dominant state proved a measure of the suppression
depth.
In our Experiment 2, the probe was presented solely
if subjects explicitly indicated that they had no motion
awareness whatsoever. Moreover, a probe presenta-
tion closely followed the onset of a dominance epoch
(see paradigm) when both the sensitivity to a probe
(Alais, Cass, O’Shea, & Blake, 2010; Baker & Cass,
2013) and the awareness of a stimulus (Baker & Cass,
2013) were low in the suppressed eye. Our data, thus,
corroborate the notion by Baker and Cass and provide
novel evidence that interocular suppression does not
require visual awareness of the image in the dominant
eye.
General discussion
Binocular rivalry is generally considered a suitable
tool for investigating the neural correlates of visual
awareness because it involves changes in dominance
and suppression of the retinal input without any change
in those inputs (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996). Our
current ﬁndings call for some caution. Our subjects
reported that they were almost always unaware of any
motion in the applied low-contrast stimuli, yet their
motion-direction judgments alternated stochastically
between the opponent motion patterns in the two eyes
(Figure 1). We obtained crucial evidence that these
alternations were at least partly induced by the same
binocular rivalry mechanism that drives the alterna-
tions at higher contrasts. First, we found that the
systematic changes in dominance alternations, which
resulted from motion coherence manipulations in one
eye, were qualitatively similar for the low-, medium-,
and high-contrast conditions and fully consistent with
L2 regardless of whether the subjects were aware of any
motion in the stimulus patch or not (Figure 2). Second,
we found that competing, low-contrast motion stimuli
were able to induce a signiﬁcant amount of interocular
suppression even if the subjects were completely
unaware of visual motion in those stimuli (Figure 6).
We thus obtained the ﬁrst empirical evidence that the
dynamic process of dominance and suppression that
underlies binocular rivalry also takes place in the
absence of visual awareness.
Note, however, that these ﬁndings do not imply that
visual awareness has no inﬂuence on the dominance
alternations or that their time courses are independent.
In the low-contrast condition, the changes in mean
dominance durations of motion direction of the
contralateral eye were steeper if the data were pooled
across aware and unaware states (Figure 2B, light gray
solid curve) compared with the data from the unaware
states only (Figure 2D, solid curve). This suggests that
the level of visual awareness does affect the rivalry
dynamics. The results from the medium-contrast
condition, for which we could split the dominance
epochs into sizable groups with high- and low-
awareness fractions, corroborate this notion (Figure 3);
both the mean dominance durations as well as the
effects of motion coherence on those dominance
durations were boosted for the high-awareness epochs.
Although it has been shown that awareness and
attention can be partially or fully dissociated either at
the behavioral (Kentridge, Nijboer, & Heywood, 2008;
Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel, Tsuchiya, & Koch,
2010) or at the neural (Schurger, Cowey, Cohen,
Treisman, & Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Wyart & Tallon-
Baudry, 2008) level, it is widely believed that attention
may be a prerequisite for perceptual awareness,
meaning that in order to consciously experience a
stimulus one must pay attention to it (Sergent, Baillet,
& Dehaene, 2005; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004). On the
other hand, several studies have shown that attention
can indeed modulate binocular rivalry at least to some
extent (Chong, Tadin, & Blake, 2005; Lack, 1973, 1978;
Meng & Tong, 2004; Meredith & Meredith, 1962;
Mitchell, Stoner, & Reynolds, 2004; Ooi & He, 1999;
van Ee, van Boxtel, Parker, & Alais, 2009; van Ee, van
Dam, & Brouwer, 2005). Moreover, despite the fact
that both behavioral (Pastukhov & Braun, 2007) and
neural (Roeber, Veser, Schroger, & O’Shea, 2011)
evidence were presented that attention is not able to
fully explain perceptual switches in binocular rivalry,
recent ﬁndings suggest that binocular rivalry is
abolished if attention is withdrawn from rivalrous
stimuli (Brascamp & Blake, 2012; Zhang, Jamison,
Engel, He, & He, 2011).
Note, however, that attention alone cannot account
for the observed compliance with L2 (Figure 2) or the
interocular suppression (Figure 3). These features are a
hallmark of binocular rivalry (Blake, 2001, 2005) and
are thought to result from cross-inhibition between
rivalrous stimuli combined with neural adaptation and
noise (Brascamp et al., 2006; Lankheet, 2006). Thus,
although our ﬁndings can be interpreted as supporting
the modulatory role of attention in binocular rivalry,
they also suggest that cross-inhibition mechanisms play
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a crucial role in the neural competition process
underlying multistable perception. This mechanistic
interpretation of our results is supported by the strong
suppression of awareness that we observed at the time
of a switch (Figure 4). This is the kind of suppression
one would expect if dominance switches were produced
by a competition-adaptation mechanism, such as
proposed by classic adaptation mutual-inhibition
models (Blake, 1989; Freeman, 2005; Lehky, 1988;
Noest et al., 2007; Wilson, 2003). Due to the adaptation
of the currently dominant population over the course
of the dominance interval, the activity levels of that
population will gradually decline, making the end of
that dominance epoch the most likely point in time for
the activity levels to drop below the awareness level.
Immediately after the dominance switch, however, the
now dominant population has recovered most from its
previous adaptation and is therefore most active,
rendering the beginning of a dominance epoch the most
likely point in time to (re)gain awareness of the
stimulus. This interpretation is in line with recent
ﬁndings that the sensitivity for probe detection over the
course of a dominance interval decreases in the
dominant eye as a result of adaptation and increases in
the suppressed eye as a result of recovery from
adaptation (Alais et al., 2010).
The ability of the brain to process visual information
in the absence of visual awareness is reminiscent of
other experimental and clinical studies in which an
uncoupling between visual awareness and visually
guided behavior is observed. Clinical studies indicate,
for example, that patients with lesions restricted to the
primary visual cortex (V1) are still able to perform
visually guided tasks correctly even though they are
entirely unaware of the stimuli to which they are
responding, a phenomenon known as blindsight
(Weiskrantz, 1998). Similar results were obtained from
neurologically normal human subjects with V1 deacti-
vated by the transcranial magnetic stimulation (Boyer,
Harrison, & Ro, 2005) and animals with surgically
removed V1 (e.g., Cowey & Stoerig, 1995; Feinberg,
Pasik, & Pasik, 1978; Isa & Yoshida, 2009; Moore,
Rodman, Repp, & Gross, 1995). Visual task perfor-
mance and visual awareness can also be dissociated in
normal observers using visual masking (e.g., Kolb &
Braun, 1995; Meeres & Graves, 1990). Pattern masks
that follow the onset of a test face-stimulus interrupt
ﬁring of face-selective neurons in the inferior temporal
cortex of macaques (Rolls & Tovee, 1994; Rolls, Tovee,
& Panzeri, 1999). Under the same conditions, human
observers did not have full conscious perception of the
faces and felt, as in blindsight, that they were guessing
even though their performance was well above chance
(Rolls, Tovee, Purcell, Stewart, & Azzopardi, 1994). It
was therefore suggested that a rather strong signal is
required to overcome a threshold for access to the
conscious processing system (Rolls & Deco, 2002). This
notion is further supported by fMRI data indicating
that dichoptic masking correlates with visual awareness
only in ventral stream areas beyond area V2 (Tse,
Martinez-Conde, Schlegel, & Macknik, 2005). In terms
of binocular rivalry, this would mean that the
activation needed for alternating dominant states to
guide behavior might be lower than the level necessary
for visual awareness. It is also possible that the
integration time constants for visually guided decision
making (Ditterich, 2006) are longer than the ones that
determine the momentary content of visual awareness.
In summary, by introducing monocular motion
coherence manipulations into the binocular rivalry
paradigm and by probing the strength of the inter-
ocular suppression induced by competing, low-contrast
motion stimuli, we have shown, for the ﬁrst time, that
ocular dominance rivalry does not require visual
awareness. We also found that ﬂuctuations in aware-
ness that did occur were temporally linked to the
dominance switches in a manner that is consistent with
adaptation reciprocal-inhibition models of binocular
rivalry. These discoveries might be interpreted as
evidence that binocular rivalry is resolved at low levels
of visual processing (Blake, 1989; Lehky, 1988; Tong,
2001). Note, however, that areas in the ventral pathway
are believed to mediate visual perception (Blake &
Logothetis, 2002; Logothetis, 1998; Wilke, Logothetis,
& Leopold, 2006) and represent a stage beyond the
resolution of ambiguities during binocular rivalry
(Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). Areas in the dorsal
pathway, on the other hand, are thought to control
visually guided actions, processing information of
which we are unaware (Fang & He, 2005; Milner &
Goodale, 1995). Our ﬁndings thus add to the literature
proposing that binocular rivalry and multistable
perception, in general, might instead ﬁnd its origin in
frontoparietal decision-making processes that guide
behavior (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Unger-
leider, 2004; Kleinschmidt, Buchel, Zeki, & Frack-
owiak, 1998; Leopold & Logothetis, 1999; Lumer,
Friston, & Rees, 1998; Rees, 2001; Ricci & Blundo,
1990; Sterzer, Russ, Preibisch, & Kleinschmidt, 2002).
Keywords: binocular rivalry, bistable perception,
dominance alternations, visual awareness
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